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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  The share of young people out of 
school and work (“the disconnection 
rate”) rose from 13.4 percent in 
February 2020 to a peak of 25.3 
percent in April 2020, and has been 
declining since that time.
n  The pandemic drove some 
individuals to disconnection, 
regardless of whether they were 
in school, at work, or already 
disconnected, but full-time workers 
saw the largest increase in transition 
to disconnection.
n  The increase in the disconnection 
rate at the beginning of the pandemic 
was mostly driven by a reduction in 
full-time work (35 hours a week or 
greater).
n  School enrollment fell at the end 
of 2020, suggesting that prospective 
students didn’t enroll and/or current 
students didn’t remain in school. The 
drop in school enrollment contributed 
to the overall persistence of the high 
disconnection rate.
n  Schools provided an alternative 
option for young part-time workers, 
as they became more likely to enroll in 
school during the pandemic compared 
to the prepandemic period.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/21-348.
At the beginning of 2020, a deadly new coronavirus known as COVID-19 began to 
spread worldwide. Tis pandemic had a large negative impact on the economy and young 
people in the United States, as businesses were shut down to contain the spread of the 
virus and many schools moved to online learning. In this paper, we use data from the 
Current Population Survey to estimate the impact of the COVID pandemic on the youth 
labor market, with a focus on youth disconnection. 
Te term “disconnected youth” refers to a group of young people who are not in 
education or training programs, nor at work. In 2019, approximately four million young 
adults aged 18 to 24 years in the United States, or 13.8 percent, were reported to be 
neither in school nor at work, the lowest percentage in the past three decades. But the 
pandemic increased the disconnection rate dramatically—from 13.4 percent in February 
2020 to 25.3 percent in April 2020. And although, controlling for seasonality, the 
disconnection rate began declining afer April, as of December 2020 the rate was still 3.7 
percentage points higher than it had been in December 2019. 
Te impact of the pandemic recession varied by what young people were doing prior 
to the pandemic. Individuals who worked full time were hit hardest, as the spike in the 
disconnection rate at the beginning of the pandemic was mostly driven by a reduction 
in full-time work (35 hours a week or more). Compared to the developing period of 
the Great Recession (2008–2010), when the unemployment rate increased dramatically, 
the pandemic recession has had a deeper impact on full-time workers: we see a larger 
increase in the transition from full-time work to disconnection during the pandemic. 
Te share of young adults working part time, conditional on not being in school, 
fell only slightly in April, then quickly rebounded to its original level. And while both 
full-time and part-time workers became more likely to go back to school during the 
pandemic compared to the prepandemic period, we observe a larger increase in the 
transition from part-time work to school. 
Taken in total, school enrollment rates barely changed at the start of the pandemic, 
increased slightly during the summer, but started to fall toward the end of 2020. Tis 
decline in the overall school enrollment rate among young people contributed to the 
persistence of a high disconnection rate at the end of 2020. Perhaps most notably, we 
observe that those starting out from a point of disconnection did not beneft from a 
transition to the school system. Tis trend demonstrates another contrast to the 2007 
recession and the recovery period that followed: between 2008 and 2010, we saw an 
increase in the transition from all states (part-time employment, full-time employment, 
school or training, and disconnection) to school, but this pattern has not yet been 
observed during the pandemic recession. 
Tere have also been disparate efects based on race and gender. At frst, the negative 
impact of the pandemic was larger for minority groups aged 18–24, regardless of gender. 
However, the gap between minority and white males has been closing, while the gap 
between minority and white females persists. 
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Compared to the 
developing period of 
the Great Recession 
(2008-2010), when the 
unemployment rate 
increased dramatically, 
the pandemic recession 
has had a deeper impact 
on full-time workers: we 
see a larger increase in the 
transition from full-time 
work to disconnection. 
The Impact of the Pandemic on Disconnection 
Figure 1 plots the seasonally adjusted impact of the pandemic. Te disconnection rate 
increased in April 2020 by more than 10 percentage points and gradually fell aferward. 
Ten, starting in October, it began to increase again slightly. Te higher disconnection 
rate suggests that during the pandemic, a large proportion of young people were derailed 
from their original plans and experienced difculty transitioning into the labor market. 
To provide a more complete picture of the impact on young people, we examined the 
changes in shares of young people in school and at work. 
Figure 1  Percentage of Young People neither in School nor at Work, 2020 
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
NOTE: This fgure shows the estimated impact of the pandemic on disconnection rate by month for the year 2020 
for young people aged 18–24. In the estimation, we use data between 2015 and 2020 and control for seasonality 
and annual trends. 
SOURCE: IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota.
 On the next page, in Figure 2, Panel A plots the share of young people enrolled in 
school or training programs. Previous research suggests that young people use school 
options to shield themselves from bad labor market outcomes (Stange 2012). During the 
pandemic recession, however, school rates barely changed, except for a temporary increase 
during the summer months. In fact, school attendance started to fall afer September. 
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the trends in work categorized into part time (< 35 hours/ 
week) and full time (≥ 35 hours/week). Te share of young people who worked part 
time remained stable. Specifcally, the percentage of youth engaged in part-time work 
fell moderately in April, then gradually started to increase. Full-time work, however, did 
not follow the same trend. Afer accounting for seasonality, we fnd that the percentage 
of young people working full time dropped by 11.2 percentage points from February 
to April—with the actual share dropping from 33 percent in February to 22 percent in 
April—and that it stayed low during the summer and early fall. Taken as a whole, Figure 
2 suggests that the increase in the disconnection rate at the beginning of the pandemic 
was mostly driven by a reduction in full-time work, but that, toward the end of 2020, the 
drop in school rates played an important role. 
Transitions among Disconnection, School, Part-Time Work, and Full-Time Work 
Table 1 shows how the impact of the pandemic varies by what a young person was 

























Te higher disconnection 
rate suggests that during 
the pandemic, a large 
proportion of young
people were derailed from 
their original plans and 
experienced difculty 
transitioning into the 
labor market. 
Figure 2  Percentage of Young People in School or at Work, 2020 
Panel A: School 
Feb    Mar  Apr  May Jun    Jul  Aug    Sep    Oct Nov Dec
Panel B: Work 










NOTE: This fgure plots the impact of the pandemic on the share of young people (18–24) in school (Panel A) 
or at work (Panel B) by month for the year 2020. For these two subfgures, we construct four mutually exclusive 
states: 1) full-time work, 2) school, 3) part-time work, and 4) disconnection. In the case of ties, we use the 
following ordering: full-time work > school > part-time work > disconnection. 
SOURCE: IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota. 
in the aggregate trends. We consider fve mutually exclusive states: 1) disconnection, 
2) school, 3) part-time work, 4) full-time work, and 5) not being interviewed in 2020 
conditional on being interviewed in 2019. Panel A reports the one-year transition 
probability, estimated using the prepandemic period (2018–2019), and Panel B reports 
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Table 1  The Impact of the Pandemic on Young Workers Based on Their 
Prepandemic State Full-time workers 
experienced an increase 




Panel A: 2018–2019 
PT Work School FT Work Missing 
full-time work to part-
time work, while part-
time workers experienced 
declines in transitioning 
to both types of work. 
Tis suggests that 
although the share of
people working part-time 
did not change much, the 







0.332 0.057 0.081 0.120 0.410 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) 
0.059 0.049 0.437 0.144 0.311 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
0.077 0.203 0.059 0.293 0.368 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) 
0.032 0.036 0.053 0.480 0.399 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Panel B: Impact of the Pandemic (2019–2020; percentage point/percent) 
Disconn. PT Work School FT Work Missing 
0.024 −0.010 −0.005 −0.011 0.002 
7.4% −17.6% −6.2% −9.4% 0.5% 
0.019 −0.001 −0.003 −0.040 0.026 
32.6% −2.5% −0.7% −27.8% 8.4% 
PT work 0.055 −0.026 0.061 −0.127 0.037 
72.0% −12.8% 102.4% −43.3% 9.9% 
FT work 0.039 0.008 0.008 −0.068 0.013 
124.3% 21.0% 14.2% −14.1% 3.3% 
NOTE: Panel A shows the estimated transition probabilities using the 2018–2019 panel from the starting state, 
represented by rows, to the destination state, represented by columns. The numbers show what percentage, 
from among those individuals aged 18–24 who were in a given starting state, end up in each of the destination 
states. The numbers in the same row add up to 1.000 by construction. The missing category includes those 
respondents who were not reinterviewed and those respondents whose status was undetermined. Panel B 
shows the change in the transition probabilities from the 2018–2019 panel to the 2019–2020 panel. In both 
panels, we restrict the sample to those whose ffth-round interview was supposed to happen after April 2019 
or April 2020 (and before December of each year). Percentage-point changes are reported in black, and percent 
changes are in blue. Delta-method-calculated standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota. 
Tough the nonresponse rate increased during the pandemic, we argue that the 
impact will not be large, because if we distribute the percentage points to the nonmissing 
states, the main observations that we discuss in this table do not change. With the caveat 
of data attrition in mind, the results suggest that the pandemic drives a proportion of 
individuals from all four starting states to disconnection. In percentage terms, full-
time workers saw the largest transition into disconnection: whereas only 3.2 percent 
of individuals working full time in 2018 transitioned to disconnection in 2019, this 
percentage more than doubled in the following year. Te impact of the pandemic on 
those who were already in disconnection appears to have been small. 
Full-time workers also experienced an increase in the transition from full-time work 
to part-time work, while part-time workers experienced declines in transitioning to both 
types of work. Tis observation suggests that although the share of people working part 
time did not change much, the composition did change. Both types of workers became 
more likely to return to school during the pandemic compared to the prepandemic 
period, so school seemed to provide some level of protection for young workers. Tose 
who started out from disconnection do not seem to have benefted from the school 
system. 
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Tough the disconnection 
rate has been declining, 
the reduction in full-time 
work, the alternative 
online instruction 
arrangement, and 
the nonresponsive or 
even declining school 
enrollment rate can, in the 
long run, negatively afect 
young people’s human 
capital accumulations and 
lifetime earnings. 
Conclusion 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, more young people stayed disconnected from the 
school system and the labor market. Tough the disconnection rate has been declining, 
the reduction in full-time work, the alternative online instruction arrangement, and the 
nonresponsive or even declining school enrollment rate can, in the long run, negatively 
afect young people’s human capital accumulations and lifetime earnings. It is important, 
therefore, to understand the needs of young people and formulate policies to support 
these young people to help them succeed. 
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